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Prof. dr. M.R. van Gils 
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LJniver'sity of Groningen, Holland 
1. Introduction 
With pleasure 1 have accepted the invitation of your president Mr. Hamel to 
give a contribution to the discussion on the topic 'library co-operation; 
trends, possibilities and conditions ' . In this paper I will limit myself to 
the more general aspects of coordination and cooperation, with the hope that 
the framework I use will be a fruitful starting point for discussion. 







Why is interorganizational cooperation a problem? 
What is interorganizational cooperation? What kind of structural confi-
gurations can be established? What are arguments for tight coupling be-
tween organizations and what are arguments for loose coupling? 
What are the main barriers to Interorganizational cooperation? 
What models can be used to promote interorganizational cooperation? 
Why is interorganizational coordination a problem 
Both in the private and public sector we find a growing concern for interor-
ganizational coordination and cooperation. In the public sector for instance 
policy-makers are confronted with the consequences of increased territorial 
and functional differentiation and specialization. If we look at the health 
care system in the Netherlands, or the welfare, or the educational system we 
see a whole network of more or less independent organisations, each claiming 
its own domain, each careful to protect its own ident.ity and each stressing 
its own uniqueness. Vet, although we live in a world of organizations we 
have tremendous difficulties in coordinating the activities of these organi-
sations. and establishing the interrelationships necessary to obtain societal 
goals. What we lack are the instruments (power, authority) for controlling 
these interrelationships between organizations, and we more of ten than not 
have to rely on the willingness of individual organizational members to 
initiate efforts in the direction of interorganizational cooperation. 
The increase in differentiation and specialization has produced systems in 
which the problem solving capacity (dealing with technological innovation, 
organizational and technical complexities, re-allocation of scarce resources) 
of governments, central coordinating agencies or other institutions are dis-
aggregated in a collection of subsystems with limited tasks, competences and 
resources, and where the relatively independent participants possess different 
bits of information, represent different interests and pursue separate, po-
tentially conflicting courses of action. The problems we are confronted with 
cut across the boundaries of separate authorities and functional jurisdictions. 
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These oroblems are the more Dressina in a Deriod in which all Western indus-
trial countries are confronted with an economic recession and therefore. a 
shortaae in means to finance the comolex structures on which our societies 
are build. We have to consider the necessitv of doinq awav with orqanizatio-
nal inefficiencies. to reorqanize our comDlex svstems so that thev wi11 with 
less costs at least maintain the same output. If we want to maintain our 
highly deve10ped health care, welfare, educational and other systems we have 
to rea1ize that we must find means to increase interorganization~ coordinatio~ 
to increase effectiveness and efficiency, as we can not any 10nger permit our-
se1ves to allocate un1imited amounts of public money to these systems. 
Is interorganizationa1 cooperation a major problem for the government, we can 
also conclude that it is of growing concern for the private sector. Structural 
overcapacity, growing costs and competition, complex and expensive technolo-
gies, the need for innovation, the efficient use of scarce resources, lead to 
a growing awareness of the necessity of cooperation between organization to 
achieve coordination. The task we are confronted wlth in a1most all sectors 
of our society is 'redesigning complex networks of forma11y a~tonomous, but 
interdependent organizations ' (Metcalfe, 1977). This requires extensive co-
ordination, and redefining ro1es and re1ationships of the organizations in-
volved in the network. 
However the attempt to iniatiate interorganizationa1 cooperation proves to be 
rather difficu1t. Organizations, more ofte~ than nog seem to be rather power-
1ess to iniatiate the necessary coordinating 1inkages. There of ten is an im-
compatabi1ity between organizations due to the fact that organizations do not 
share the same goals, have different e1ite-va1ues or do nog consider their 
technologies and resource needs as comp1ementary. Even when there is compati-
bi1ity and comp1ementarity in 'objective ' terms, they exist nevertheless in 
the perception of decisionmakers and these perceptions can create rea1 
blockades. 
All this brings us to our central question: what modes are there to ensure 
coordinated po1icy actions of re1ative1y independent actors. For this we need 
networks of separate but interdependent organizations where the co11ective 
capabi1ities of a number of participants are essentia1 for effective prob1em-
solving or where the activities of individua1 units can be guided by more 
general po1icy considerations. 
3. The concepts of coordination and cooperation 
With coordination we try to link the activit'i~es of relative1y independent 
units to ach;eve a specific goal. The fo11owing mechanisms are most1y used 
by organizations to coordinate their interna1 affairs: mutua1 adjustment, 
direct supervision, standardization of work processes, standardization of 
work outputs and standardization of workskiffs. The choice of a specific 
mechanism depends on the comp1exity of the task to be done, the specific 
characteristics of the task, the way tasks are re1ated to one another, the 
felt need for organizationa1 f1exibility etc. One can say there isa certain 
amount of 'organizational choice ' in se1ecting.the most appropiate coordi-
nation mechanisms. As coordination aims at contro11ing the behavior of human 
actors, the '1evers ' for such control are power and influence. 
With the term coorpation we describe the joint action of two or more parties 
for mutua1 benefit. Cooperation invo1ves coordination. Cooperation is in its 
essence a vo1untary act by parties involved. When interorganizationa1 coordi-
nation becomes more and more important the wi11ingness to cooperate becomes 
a necessary condition. The choice of a coordinative mechanism in a coopera~ 
tive situation depends on the amount of power and inf1uence that can be used 
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by the parties involved. Tn some situations coordination can be ensured by 
'coercion'. The 'coerced' party has no option but to meet the preferences 
of the coercing party or bear some sanction imposed by that party. As coer-
cion is in our society (fortunately) a not toD preferred instrument to achieve 
coo t'dination, we will have to rely on forms of cooperation. In the field of 
interorganizational decision-making this is not an easy task as there is not 
an overall authority structure to resolve conflicts. Interorganizational co-
opera tion thet'eforedepends very of ten on the outcome of multilateral bar-
']aining between the representatives of orqanizations involved. Coooerat ion 
liever the less deoends on the caoacitv and willingness of organizations to 
solve problems that meet the different needs of various groups. Some pessimists 
in our society, and may be they are right, seriously doubt our capacity for 
developing these joint courses of action and fear that bureaucratic and 
centralized hierarchic control (and therefor coercion) are the only means that 
will work to ensure coordination. 
Coordination networks (hhetiler voluntary or coercive of nature) can differ in 
intensity of the interrelationships and in the kind of structure to be de-
veloped. The choice of a specific type of network depends on questions like: 
- the price (loss of autonomy) organizations are willing to pay for coordi-
natinq their efforts; 
- the amount of cooperation actors need to realize their aims; 
- the felt need for cooperation; 
- the amount of power and influence of the actars in the network. 
The following major structural forms in interorganizational networks can be 
distinguished. 
A. Horizontal structure: There is nog hierarchical relationship between the 
participating organizations, although there can be 
differences in power potential. There is no centra l 
coordinating agency. Parties agree to for instance 
share information, coordinate their efforts etc. 
but each actor more or less remains autonomous. 
Central coordinating Agency. If the horizontal structure is in itself in-
---,~:---. -=S-\--C':::-/--. -= :;/o:-.--><---.:<..s U-f7f.,M-; C i ent f 0 r th e cao rd i na t i on ne ed s', ac to r s ca n 
, / agree to create within the existing horizontal 
~ L structure to establish a central coordinating agency 
S. 
• C. Central coordinating 
• ~/:T \ ',&. 
agency with hierarchical authority. The participa-
ting organizations make themselves subordinate to a 
central agency with hierarch~cal power . In fact a 
hierarchical level is create! and actors have dele-
qated some of their power to this aqency. 
With these thre8 forms (If co0rdination we have moved from a level of looselv 
coupled (horizontal) orqanizations to one in which there are strong vertical 
ties, to one from more or less voluntary relations to one with a high specifi-
city of guidelines and in which a tight coupling of organizations has 
taken place. 
There are in the field of interorganizational decisionmaking and cooperation 
proponents for tight and proponents for loose coupling 0f organizations. 
Those that favor tight coupling state that hierarchica1 control must be used 
to negate the tendencies of organizations to pursue narrow, and sectarian in-
teresta. Output~ that berefit the eni.ire population se veu dre only possible 
in structures Wf' ere speeal interest::> are held tightly 'lr, ·~ heck. 
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Arguments in favor of tight coupling refer for instanee to(és. Aldrich, 1977): 
- The indivisibility of problems. Some problems cannot be broken down into 
seperate pieces and if different oraanizations work on the oroblem from 
their own oersoective one aets a series of oartia1 solutions. Examo1es are 
pollution control , the coordination of economic deve10pment activities 
between government, management and unions. 
Organizational autonomv and seperate authoritv are barriers to effective 
prob1em solution. Some observers arque that the existence of autonomous 
orqanizations and proqrams. each with itw own protected boundaries. not 
on1v fraqments prob1ems but a1so creates unsusmountab1e obstac1es to coor-
dination. Vested and parochia1 interests, the defense of domains prec1ude 
effective coordination. 
Normal interorganizationa1 transactions are focussed on organizationa1 
needs, not on the common welfare. This argument stresses that norma1 inter-
organizationa1 transactions are on too 10w a level and are too issue speci-
fic to achieve coordination among organizations at the population level, 
even when they are ostensib1y dea1ing with the same general problem. 
Large, dominant organizations benefit the most from loose coupling. In this 
argument it is argued that in the absence of authoritative, comprehensive, 
and p1anned coordination, the flow of resources in a system will benefit 
the all-ready wellof organizations. 
There are of course a1so various arguments that favor loose coupling: 
Minimizing the degree of coupling allows for maximum responsiveness, inno-
vation and adaptation to the 10ca1 invironment. Here it is argued that a 
decentralized structure makes decision makers visible and accessible, thus 
promoting pub1ic accountability. That decentra1ization stimulates feedback 
and mutual adjustment. 
In general one can say that a loosely coupled structure is most appropriate 
under cnnditions where the environment is heterogeneous, decisions must be 
made r ·' idly and a high degree of responsiveness to demands is required. 
- Dup1ication and overlap of organizationa1 domains make some positive contri-
bution in an interorganizationa1 system. 
Here the importance of redundancy is stated. In uncertain environments re-
dundancy can increase the probabilityof accomplishing tasks. 
A last argument sometimes used infavor of loose coup1ing is that tight 
coupling and high centrality may mean a 10ss of the benefits of division 
of labor and specialization. 
4. Some potential barriersto cooperation 
Organizations or organizational decisionmakers are typica11y oriented to the 
acquisition and defense of an adequate supply of resources. Two basic types 
of resources are central: the necessity of money to acquire scarce resources 
and authority. Authority refers to the legitimation of activities, the right 
and responsibi1ity to carryout programs of a certain kind. We call these 
claim 'domains ' . The possession of a domain permits the organization (or a 
profession) to operate in a certain sphere, claim support for its activities 
and define proper practices within its realm. 
On the basis of this we can hypothesize that if cooperation poses a threat to 
the autonomy andjor the identity of the organizations they will be reluctant 
to cooperate. Integration into a network will be considered as highly pro-
blematic and threatening unless organizations are assured that their overall 
autonomy will not be hampered or that any autonomy which they would be re-
quired to surrender would yield compensatory returns. 
A second hypothesis is that if there is a lack of domain consensus between 
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ot'gani zations. or' if organizations have no positive evaluation of each other, 
or if they disagree along ideological lines or if coordination threatens the 
maintendnce of order and effeetiveness in the established programms of an 
ot'g anization, this is likely to preclude cooperation. Congruent expectations 
ca n be viewed as a prerequisite for cooperation. 
A third hypothesis is that if there are conflicting requirements for integra-
tion in systems in which an organization has multiple memberships this will 
hinder collaboration with each system. 
University libraries probably are members of more than one system and th i s 
frequently results in the library organization receiving conflicting demands. 
It has to participate in the overall network of library organizations and i n 
the vertical programms of the university to which it belongs. This very of te 
can lead to forms of conflict. 
One might argue that organizations are willing to enter into cooperative re-
lationships when 
a. there is a felt need for cooperation due to environmental eireumstances ; 
b. if the benefits of cooperation are clearly visible and 
e. if the organization feels rather secure and has a strong power posit i on 
in the network, so that it can bargain for results that are benefic i al 
to the org~nization. 
Vet even if conditions for eoncerted decision making and cooperative behavior 
are supportive, organizations quite of ten show a considerable amount of be-
havior which is not directed towards either problem sol ving or bargaining 
over respective preferences but which is clearly devoted to defeating the 
proeess and to making the outcome as ambiquous and innocuous as possible. 
Even if there a high integrative pay off to the participating organizati on s 
emoti onal factors ean be so dominant that organizations prefer some kind of 
avoidance behavior and stay oriènted to the existing status quo . 
One can speculate about the motives behind this avoidance behavior. Reasons 
of ten are: 
- Fear for identity loss and loss of autonomy; 
Fear for bureaucratie procedures; 
A feeling that efforts to eooperation will eventually not succed at all. 
and that it is a loss of time; 
Fea r that eooperative efforts increase the visibility of an organizat ion 
and therefore increase the organisation's vulnerabilities to attaek and 
criti ci sm. 
5. An action model to promote interorganizational eooperation 
To establish interorganizational cooperation is a difficult and in genera l 
time consuming process. The proeess is therefor so difficult as tha partici -
pants have partly shared and partly eonflicting views and objeetives. They 
also bring into this process different policies, attitudes and beliefs , based 
on differences in culture, history and direct experiences. One can notice 
although network cooperation aims at problem solving, that bargaining be-
tween the participants is a rather common fenomenom . 
Designing a suecesful network for interorganizational cooperation necessi -
tates therefore the development of a frame of reference that organizations 
can share and the creation of mechanisms that preserves cooperation but a1so 
deal with conflict maintenance. 
The question is to what extent are l'epresentatives of organizations invol ved 
in designing sueh a proeess able to handle all these eonstraints. If there 
is a distinct attitude towards problemsolving, if there are not too many 
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conflicting interests and if their is enough mutual trust and support 
designing such a process might not be so difficult. If the conditions how-
ever are more difficult it might be worthwhile to work with a neutral out-
sider who has the respect and support of all parties involved. 
This neutral outsider should but emphasis on designing the process. Substan-
tive or structural recommendations are less important here then process re-
co~nendations. The outsider will in general not be asked for his expertise 
with t'egards to the substantive content of the problems at stake, as this 
expertise is already available within the organizations themselves. The main 
task of the outsider is to facilitate the process of interorganizational 
leaning. 
The outsider should be aware of the bargaining elements that creep into the 
situation, of the fact that a win - loose situation can develop, of the stra-
tegies and tactics parties use to influence the situation or to avoid that 
decisions are made but which at the same time can create conflicts. In short 
he should be aware that the design of a process for interorganizational co-
operation is in essence a political decision making process. 
The task of the outsider is to establish conditions which can lead to the de-
velopment of the network. An effective instrument can be to start with a 
working party that can be regarded as a replicate of the interorganizational 
network. This microcosm models the large-scale political forces and provides 
a mechanism for exploing the interconnections among problems and collectively 
thinking through ways of dealing with them (cf. Metcalfe, 1977J. 
The working party should deal with concrete issues on the basis of papers pre-
pared for the discussions. The detailed analysis of these concrete problems 
within a specific time period helps to bring down stereotypes, to build in-
terpersonal contacts and to recognize the structural conflicts that have to 
be resolved. The legitimacy of each other's claims can sa be recognized and 
the problems of each organiztion better understood. Here the assistance of 
the outsider can be helpful in creating a frame of reference the organizations 
can share, and enabling them to recognize the areas in which coordination of 
activities can be achieved. It is important that the consultant as a neutral 
outsider keeps in close contact with the organizations represented in the 
working party, as this keeps him informed of the relevanee of the recommen-
dations made and their political feasability. 
In this short paper same issues relevant for interorqanization cooperation 
are dealt with. It is argued that in our society it is a problem of growing 
concern, but at the same time a difficult political process. The action model 
is not the panacee for solving all the problems of d signing the 
process of i nterorgani zati ona 1 cooperation, but a way to cre'ate conditi ons 
suitable for such a process. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. S. Westberg: lagree from my own experience that one of the best ways of achieving 
cooperation is by starting to try to work together on specific problems. This does 
produce practical results. 
Dr. P.J.C.A. Pinxter: When you are trying to cooperate, it always seems difficult to ta lk 
about real concrete questions with other people. Instead, all sorts of emotional aspects 
come into play. 1 am always surprised at how we cannot talk about problems openly ; 
instead, we get avoiding actions. 
van Gils: Yes, people do not behave simply ra tionéllly, but also emotionally. If you are 
from a large organization, you feel secure and can afford to be open, but in a smal! 
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organization there is fear that you may suffer from the results, and this gives rise to defensive attitudes. Cooperation takes a long time to achieve. 
Mr. M.B. Line: Dr. Johnson referred to a man's second marriage as "the triumph of love over experience". There is a great urge towards cooperation, whieh is rather like marriage with more people involved, but in practiee problems arise, partly because the practieal benefits have not been fuUy calculated or emphasized, and the costs turn out to be greater than anticipated. 
van Gils: Cooperation is likely to be most successful if it is forced on organizations, for example by governments, in response to economie conditions (forced marriages). The bodies concerned have to learn to live with one another. 
Prof. A.J. Evans: There is a conflict in the autonomy of universities in developing new subjects or continuing uneconomie (that is smaU) departments, which in terms of library provision are relatively very expensive. Although the finance comes from the government and some measure of con trol exists, we still retain our academie freedom within the universities and the library almost inevitably has to follow the university policy. 
Mr. A.C. Bubb: Is there not a conflict between the professional need to build up an independent operation and the loss of personal authority implied by cooperation? 
van Gils: I fuUy agree with you there. There is often ten sion between the professional outlook on work organization and the needs of the client. Wh en money is scarce, this results in increased conflict. 
Mr. P. Durey: Professor van Gils, you mentioned the conflict whieh can arise, when considering a cooperative venture, in distinguishing between the interests of an individual institution and those of a wider sphere. Is it proper to take the view that, since one is employed by a particular institution, the interests of that institution should prevail? 
van Gils: You always have to make choiees. If institutions do not establish horizontal ties we shaU never get anywhere, and it is our personal responsibili ty to develop these links. Conflicting links provide a continuous dilemma in whieh we ourselves are of ten quite powerless. 
Dr. D. Shaw: There seem to be three possible structures for organizational control, viz: (i) the benevolent dietatorship (ii) the ful1y democratie system with equal voting rights (HO a mixed system whieh is an attempt to reconcile the best elements of (i) and (ii). 
van Gils: I am not quite in favour of the one man - one vote system, because the kind of problems we are faced with is not easily solved in this way. I believe in the need for centralization of authority, which enables decisions to be made and implemented, but a dietatorship has also many disadvantages, such as lack of flexibility. 1 am a looking for a middle of the way solution - as in (Hn. 
Mr. G.A. Hamel: Can you give us adviee as to how one can educate professionals to become more open to cooperation? 
van Gils: One of the first elements is, "Is there a real need for cooperation, and is this need feIt?" If there is a need, what are the issues that are relevant and concrete? Be careful to study the bene fits and losses. Try to avoid emotional barriers, and be aware of the emotional aspects involved. 
Mr. T.J. Tanzer: I would like to have your opmlOn on how to try to depersonalize problems and avoid the defense of personal points of view. 
van Gils: I think you can depersonalize problems by paying attention to the problem itself 
- be objective. This is, of course, diffieult to achieve in practice. 
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